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2John P. Judd and Bharat Trehan*
Based on a single system ofequations that contains income, prices, a
market rate ofinterest, and the components ofM3, we find that M1
became highly susceptible to adjustments in the public's portfolio of
liquid assets in the 1980s, and thus is unlikely to be a reliable guide to
monetary policy in the future. The behavior of the broader monetary
aggregates has not changed significantly from the 1970s, and both M2
and M3 are broad enough to internalize mostportfolio adjustments that
are likely to occur. Therefore, they are likely to be more reliable as
monetarypolicyindicatorsthanM1, although the analysis does notimply
that either will be as reliable as M1 once was.
Last February, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker testified before the Senate Banking Com-
mittee about the Federal Reserve's 1987 plans for
monetary policy. An important element of those
plans consists ofthe target ranges for growth in the
monetary aggregates. In his testimony, the Chair-
man reported that the Fed had reaffirmed the 51 /2 to
8lf2 percent 1987 target ranges for growth in the
broader monetary aggregates, M2 and M3, that had
tentatively been set in July 1986.
Volckeralso statedthatthe Fed haddecidednotto
set a target range for the narrow aggregate Ml.
Instead, it will closely monitor the behavior ofM1
"... in light of other information, including
whether or not changes in that aggregate tend to
reinforce or negate concerns arising from move-
ments in M2 and M3."1 Then, in its July 1987
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meeting, the FOMC tentatively planned not to set a
range for M1 in 1988. Thus, for the time being, Ml
has been given a subordinate role in the formulation
and implementation ofmonetary policy where, tra-
ditionally, it has received greater emphasis than the
broader monetary aggregates.
ThedowngradingofM1's role in monetary policy
for 1987 reflects concern about that aggregate's
continued reliability as an indicator of monetary
policy. Traditionally, M1 was considered a primary
policy indicator, both by the Fed and by many
outside observers, in part because it had the desir-
able property of containing most of the media of
exchange in the economy, that is, currency and
checkable deposits. Since M1 offered unique trans-
actions services, the public's demand to hold that
aggregate was not highly responsive to the kinds of
portfolio considerations - for example, relative
interest yields and terms-to-maturity - that deter-
mine the public's demand to hold the savings-type
instruments that are in M2 and M3.
Because M1 had few close substitutes, itsbehaviorwas not substantially affected by difficult-
to-predict portfolio substitutions, and, as a conse-
quence, movements in MI were dominated by
changes in macroeconomic variables, such as
income and prices, that are the concern of Fed
policy.
Chairman Volcker's testimony cited two main
sourcesofconcern about MI'sreliability as a mone-
tary policy indicator. First, deposit-rate deregula-
tion, which began in the case of MI with the
authorization of nationwide NOW accounts at the
end of1980and was completed in March 1986, may
have made MI more ofa savings-type aggregate. In
suchcase, MI most likely would have lost its unique
transactions character and its relationship with
income and prices might thus have become less
predictable. Second, this change may have led to
MI's highly unusual behavior over the past two
years. In both 1985 and 1986, MI grew extremely
rapidly while economic growth was moderate and
inflation was subdued. In contrast, M2 and M3
behaved much more in accordance with their histor-
ical relationships with income and prices.
This paper assesses the changes in the relation-
ship between MI and economic developments for
1985-86, and draws out the implications for the
future reliability of that aggregate as a monetary
policy indicator. The paper then assesses the
reliability ofM2 and M3 as alternative indicators for
the Fed.
Based on a vector autoregression, our basic find-
ing is that MI became highly susceptible to adjust-
ments in the public's portfolio ofliquid assets in the
1980s. In particular, the rapid growth in MI in
1985-86 appears to have been related to a large
reduction in the public's demand to hold small time
deposits. That change in demand probably was
caused by reductions in spreads of yields on small
time deposits compared with those on NOW and
other more liquid accounts. Movements in MI in
1985-86 therefore had little to do with general
output and price trends. Given the nascent suscep-
tibility ofMI to portfolio disturbances, it is unlikely
to be a reliable guide to policy in the future.
The broader monetary aggregates were relatively
accurate monetary policy indicators in 1985-86
primarily because they were broad enough to inter-
nalize the portfolio shifts that occurred. Moreover,
our analysis suggests M2 and M3 should be able to
internalize most portfolio reallocations that are
likely to occur. Thus, our analysis strongly supports
the Fed's recent action to downgrade MI in favor of
greater reliance on M2 and M3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section I, we summarize the major poten-
tial problems that can develop in the public's
demand to hold money as the result ofthe financial
deregulation in the 1980s. We then go on to review
the empirical evidence on the demand for money in
the 1980s, focusing special attention on the prob-
lems with MI in 1985-86, as well as the stability of
M2 and M3 in this period. In Section II, we use a
statistical technique called vector autoregression to
analyze the behaviorofMI, M2, and M3, and their
reliability as monetary policy indicators. Section III
presents policy implications and conclusions.
I. The Demand for the Monetary Aggregates
Over most of the period since the mid-1970s, inflation than the more broadly defined monetary
when the Federal Reserve began to express its aggregates, M2 and M3, which include liquid sav-
monetary policy in terms of the monetary aggre- ings instruments that do not function as fully as part
gates, MI has received primary emphasis. MI con- ofthe medium ofexchange.
sists of the outstanding stock ofcurrency and fully An important necessary condition for MI's lead-
checkable deposits, and thus corresponds closely to ing-indicator characteristic is that the public's
the theoretical concept of "money" in mac- demand to hold MI is a stable function of a small
roeconomic theory. It has been found to be subject to number of macroeconomic variables that are of
a reasonable degree of control by the Federal interest to monetary policymakers - income,
Reserve, and, until recently, has been considered a prices and a market interest rate. MI traditionally
more reliable leading indicator of rea! GNP and has been considered more likely than M2 and M3 to
6have a stable and simple demand function because
ofMI's unique role as the main part ofthe medium
of exchange, and because its rate of return has not
been determined by market considerations but
instead has been set by regulation. Such a narrow
"medium-of-exchange" aggregate had a good
chance of having a stable and relatively uncompli-
cated demand function because it had few close
substitutes. At the same time, the constancy of its
own yield meant that changes in the supply ofM1
had predictable effects on the interest yields on
other financial instruments. The deregulation of
deposit interest rates and the introduction of new
liquid instruments therefore have the potential to
interfere with M1's usefulness for monetary policy
by making the public's demand to hold that aggre-
gate more difficult to predict.
In cataloging the effects ofsuch financial market
changes on money demand, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between the adjustment effects during the
transition period after a change and the equilibrium
effects, which persist even after full adjustment has
been made. For example, deregulation of yields on
M1 deposits initially would cause the demand for
Ml to shift up as the public pursues the more
attractive yields. This shift, in tum, would cause Ml
growth rates to increase temporarily, relative to any
given changes in income, prices and the market rate
ofinterest, until the new, permanently higher, level
of desired Ml balances is achieved. During such
transition periods, monetary policy can go off
course, since it is difficult to estimate the size, speed
and duration of such demand shifts while they are
occurring.
However, the problems for monetary policy
caused by such transition effects are likely to be
temporary since once the new equilibrium level of
Ml is attained, the relation of Ml growth to its
underlying determinants should return to its histor-
ical norm. Since deposit rate deregulation now is
complete, these transition effects, which were of
primary importance earlierin this decade, no longer
are major issues.
Of more immediate concern are the permanent
problems deposit-rate deregulation may have
causedfor MI-targetingifhigheryields on MI have
led the public to use Ml as a savings vehicle to a
greaterdegree than in thepast. Such a change could
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contaminate M1's unique transaction character and
cause it to become a closer substitute for other
financial instruments. As a result, the public's
demandto hold Ml might have becomemore highly
responsive to changes in the spreads between Ml's
own rate ofreturn and rates paid on a wide range of
otherfinancial instruments. Shifts in investors' pref-
erences for various maturities and liquidity charac-
teristics also could have larger effects on M I
demand.
In general, since Ml may have become more like
financial assets held for investment purposes,
changes in the demand for MI could be dominated
at various times by difficult-to-predict shifts in the
composition of the public's portfolio, and only
incidentally by changes in the variables that are of
interest to the policymaker - income and prices.
Such portfolio shifts would show up both as
instability in estimatedM1demandfunctions and as
unexpected shifts in reduced-form relationships
between Ml and nominal GNP.
Deposit rate deregulation also could have made
MI demand more difficult to predict by making it
depend on how depository institutions respond to
movements in market yields in setting theiroffering
rates both on transactions accounts and on other
time and savings deposits that are substitutes for
Ml. Before deregulation, the "own-rate" on Ml
was fixed by government fiat, as were the yields
payable on most of its close substitutes. With
deregulation, the speed and degree to which banks
adjust deposit rates to follow market rates determine
how sensitively the opportunity cost of Ml varies
with market interest rates, opening up a whole new
range of uncertainties for the policymaker. For any
given elasticity of M1 demand with respect to the
opportunity cost of holding it, the elasticity of
demand with respect to market rates will be smaller
the more rapidly banks adjust their rates on MI
deposits to changes in yields on market instruments.
Thus, banks' deposit rate-setting behavior helps
determine the overall relationship between a change
in the marketrate ofinterestandthedemandfor MI.
Deposit rate deregulation can affect the broader
monetary aggregates as well. A recent example is
the introduction of Money Market Deposit
Accounts in December 1982, which caused M2 to
grow extremely rapidly relative to M3 in a transitionperiod that lasted for two months. The introduction
into the broader aggregates of instruments with
interest rates that can vary freely with market rates
undoubtedlyhas alteredthe behaviorofthose aggre-
gates as the general level ofrates has varied over the
business cycle.
However, recent deregulation most likely has had
smaller permanent effects on M2 and M3 than on
Ml largely because the interest rate restrictions on
the broader aggregates prior to deregulation were
less severe than the prohibition of the payment of
interest on Ml. Prior to mid-1978, all of the time
and savings deposits in M2 were subject to interest
rate ceilings, but those ceilings were set well above
zero. Then, in mid-1978, the deregulation of M2
began in earnest with the introduction of the small
denominationsix-month money marketcertificates,
which had ceilings that vary with Treasury bill rates.
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Large time deposits in M3 have been free ofinterest
rate restrictions since the early 1970s.
In summary, significant proportions of M2 and
M3 offered interest rates that were not far below
market rates even before deregulation, so these
aggregates were attractive savings vehicles for indi-
viduals in the earlier period as well. Thus, a priori,
we would expect deposit rate deregulation to have
had a smaller impact on the nature of these aggre-
gates. Furthermore, M3 is likely to have been
affected even less than M2, since M3 already con-
tained accounts that were free of interest rate ceil-
ings.
1986 1985
percent annual rate, 1.0 percentmore than the value
predicted by the model. Forthe two-yearperiod as a
whole the model's simulation of M3 growth at an
8.0 percent annual rate is quite close to the actual
rate of7.9 percent.
The stabilityofthe demandfor the broaderaggre-
gates in combination with the upward shift in M1
demand suggests that Ml has been adversely
affected by portfolio substitutions that were inter-
nalized within the broader monetary aggregates.
Chart 1 provides a perspective on these portfolio
substitutions. The upper panel shows growth rates
in the components ofM3 that do notcarry terms to
maturity plotted against the components ofM3 that
do carry terms to maturity. This distinction is based
on the liquidity of financial assets, which is an
important characteristic of investors' demands for











Empirical Evidence on Money Demand
The evidence up to 1985 casts doubt on the
hypothesis that the demand for M1 would be
seriously affected by deregulation. Whenthere were
shifts in M1demand (1974-76 and 1981), they were
in the downward direction. 2•3 This suggests that
theseepisodesofunusual M1behavioroccurrednot
as a result of deregulation, but rather because of
deposit rate regulations that were still in place in a
period of rapid inflation and high nominal market
interestrates. Moreover, empirical tests for changes
in the interestelasticity ofMl demand showed only
a slightchange- the elasticity had becomeslightly
more negative.4
The first clearupward shift in M1demand during
the 1980s occurred over the last two years. On the
surface, the timing ofthis shift is surprising since it
occurred after deregulation was largely complete.
We offer a tentative explanation for this timing
below.
Table I shows the money demand simulations
obtained from the San Francisco Money Market
Model.5 Except for the first few months in 1985, the
model has consistently underpredicted Ml growth,
so that the difference between the actual and simu-
lated value ofM1has increased over time. M1grew
at an average annual rate of 13.9 percent from
December 1984 to December 1986, while the
model predicted mean annual growth of 8.3 per-
cent.
The simulated value ofM2 has tracked actual M2
more closely (see Table 1). For the two-year period
ending in December 1986, M2 grew at an 8.5
9Monetary Aggregates" in the box.) The non-tenn
M3 components include M1, overnight repurchase
agreements and eurodollars, money market deposit
accounts, passbook savings accounts, and money
marketmutual fund shares. The tenncomponents of
M3 include small denomination (less than
$100,000) time deposits, large denomination time
deposits, and term repurchase agreements and
eurodollars. The upper panel shows that the non-
tenn component of M3 and the tenn component
have moved inopposite directions, that is, they have
behaved as substitutes. This is true of both trend
growth and ofthe fluctuations in the growth rates of
these components over this period.
The bottom panel ofChart 1 shows growth rates
ofMI acomponentofnon-term M3 - and ofthe
remainder of non-term M3. This latter component,
which we call liquid savings, contains the instru-
ments in M3 that are not fully checkable, that is,
instruments that are not in M1and do not have fixed
terms to maturity. (For these and other monetary
definitions see the box labeled "Monetary Aggre-
gates.") Growth in the two non-term components,
Ml and liquid savings, has been positively corre-
lated during 1985 and 1986. In otherwords, M1has
behaved similarly to the liquid savings instruments
inM2.
Taken together, these panels suggest that the
distinction between tenn and non-term accounts has
been an important margin of substitution within
instruments in M3, whereas the distinction between
checkable and non-checkable deposits has not been
an important consideration over the last two years.
The pattern of growth in the components of M3 is
consistent with the idea that MI may have been
contaminated with savings balances and that its
behavior may no longer be determined by medium-
of-exchange characteristics only.
II. Portfolio Substitution
The evidence in Chart 1is consistentwith the idea
that M1has taken on the characteristics ofa savings
aggregate, but by no means does that evidence
represent a rigorous test since it covers only two
years of data and does not control for factors other
than portfolio substitution that are likely to affect
growth in the components ofM3. In this section, we
fonnally test the proposition that Ml has become
more susceptible to portfolio shifts in the deregu-
lated environment of the 1980s by estimating a
vector autoregression (VAR).
Estimating a VAR is a method ofexamining the
relationship between a set ofvariables and theirpast
values. By imposing relatively few restrictions on
the dynamic relationships between the variables in
the model, aVAR, in effect, allows the datato speak
for themselves. Statistical tests are used to check
whether past values of a given variable are signifi-
cant in a particular equation. The estimated equa-
tions can then be transfonned to obtain "impulse
response functions" that show how the variables
respond over time to various shocks, or unpredicted
movements, in the variables ofthe system. Finally,
the relative importance of different shocks for pre-
dicting future values of the variables in the system
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can be estimated using "variance decompositions".
The VAR we estimated includes the variables that
appear in conventional Ml demand equations (Ml,
real personal income, RPY, the implicit consump-
tion deflator, DEF, and the 6-month commercial
paper rate, R), and, in addition, the quantities of
monetary assets believed to be close substitutes for
Ml.6 We hoped that inclusion ofthese quantities, in
combination with a market interest rate, would
enable us to capture the combined effects of port-
folio considerations in the demand for Ml -
including changes in relevant interest rate spreads,
changes in preferences for tenn-to-maturity and
risk, as well as any other factors that consistently
cause individuals to re-allocate their portfolios
across various assets. We choseto includequantities
rather than interest rate spreads because the quan-
tities are likely to pick up the effects ofchanges in
spreads plus other factors such as those mentioned
above.
To illustrate the last point, in April 1987 there was
a large movement in Ml that cannot be attributed to
changes in interest rates. Ml increased by $11
billion, apparently because individuals moved11funds from non-transactions accounts to pay taxes.
To the extent that these funds were moved out of
other accounts in M3, they should be picked up by
our specification but not by a model that relied on
interest.rate spreads. (In theory, seasonal adjust-
ments should remove such movements from the
da.ta.Inpra.ctice, however, itis difficultto determine
exactly how large such effects are likely to be.)
The specific monetary components we include, in
addition to MI, are small time deposit,i, liquid
savings, and large term accounts (see the box
"Monetary Aggregates"). As will become evident,
this set of monetary components permits us to
analyze the important portfolio substitutions that
have occurred in recent years betweenaccounts with
and accounts without terms to maturity. Further-
12more,.by aggregating these components, we can
assess the effects of portfolio disturbances on the
broaderaggregates, M2 and M3.7 (Note that M2 =
Ml + small time deposits + liquid savings, and
M3 ::::; M2.+ large term accounts.)
To analyze theeffectsoffinancia14ereguilltion on
the behavior of the monetary aggregates, we have
defined two sample periods: the pre-deregulation
period extending from Jam.lllry 1974 to June 1979
and the post-deregulation period extending from
July 1981 to December 1986. The beginnillg date
for the early period avoids the disturbances caused
by the removal (in 1973) ofinterest rate ceilings on
largetime deposits. The sampleendsinmid-1979to
avoiddistortions from thechangeinFederal Reserve
operating procedures later that year (see Spindt and
Tarhan, 1987, for a description ofthe change). We
have also included a dummy variable for the period
up to June 1976 to capture the well-known down-
ward shiftinMl demand over that period (see Judd
and Scadding, 1982).
In the latersample, weomitthefirst sixmonths of
data for 1981 to avoid confusing the one-time porte
folioreallocations that may have followed the intro-
duction of nationwide NOW accounts with the
interactions that may have occurred once the initial
Chart 2
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13adjustment was complete. We also have included
constant dummy variables for the months from
December 1982 to February 1983 to take accountof
theone-time portfolio re-allocation following the
introduction of MMDAs andSuper-NOWs.
All variables are includedas the first difference of
logs. We use Sims' (1980) Chi-square test to deter-
mine the appropriate lag length for the VAR over
both sample periods. Our tests reveal that in both
samples a lag length of 2 months is statistically
indistinguishable (at a 5 percent significance level)
from lag lengths of 3 to 5 months.
Empirical Results
Mlandthe Other Components ofM3
The results fromtheVARsupport the hypothesis
that deregulation has changed the nature of the
monetary·aggregates. They are consistent with MI
having become more like savings-type assets in the
period ofderegulation, andhence having lost much
ofits transactions character.
Table 2 showssummarystatistics from the esti-
matedequations for the monetary components over
the two sample periods. Abbreviations for the mon-
Chart 3
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14etary variables are explained in the box "Monetary
Aggregates." Themarginal significancelevels indi-
cate which variables are important in predicting
future values ofthe various components. According
to convention, a significance level less than 0.05
suggests that pastvalues ofthat variable do have an
impact on the dependent variable.
In the post-deregulation period, past values of
hoth small time deposits and liquid savings individ-
ually provide statistically significant information
about MI. By contrast, during the pre-deregulation
period, none of the other monetary components
provides significantinformation about MI. Foreach
component of M3 we also tested whether the
remaining components of M3 taken together
provide statistically significant information about
future values ofthat particularcomponent. ForMI,
the answer is yes after deregulation, but not before.
There is evidencethat the same is true for large term
deposits and small time deposits, although there the
results are weaker. (Correlations between the
residuals obtainedfrom the VAR, thatis, the predic-
tion errors in the equations, are shown in Table Bl
of Appendix B.)
These results show that, in the post-deregulation
period, movements in the various componeI}ts of
M3 (withtheexceptionoftheliquid savings compo-
nent) are more closely related to one another than
before - even after the effects of past changes in
income, prices, and a market rate of interest have
been taken into account.
The impulse response functions inCharts 2and 3
show what typically happens to the levels of Ml,
liquid savings, small time deposits, and large term
accounts over time when there is an unpredicted
increase in selected variables, taking into account
the full dynamic interactions estimated in the VAR.
These responses are plotted in terms ofthe percent
deviation ofthe responding variable from its initial
level in response to aone-standarddeviation change
15in the "shock" variable. Since our focus is on
substitutions between different monetary compo-
nents, we showthe effectofinterest rate shocks and
shocks to the monetary components (large term
accounts, small time deposits and liquid savings)
only.8
The portfolio-substitution characteristics of MI
across the two periods are strikingly different. Con-
sider, for example, the effects ofinterestrate shocks.
Panel (a) ofChart 2 shows that in the pre-deregula-
tion period, an unanticipated increase in the interest
rate had only a small negative effect on the level of
Ml. In the second period, by contrast, the effect is
noticeably larger, with the decline in MI continuing
for at least two years following the interest rate
shock.
The response ofMI to shocks to the other mone-
tary components also is markedly different in the
two periods. In the pre-deregulation period, Ml
stays closeto its original level afterashockto any of
the components of M3. In the post-deregulation
period, by contrast, Ml decreases immediately fol-
lowing shocks to bothlargeterm accounts and small
time deposits, and then keeps declining for approx-
imately a year before stabilizing at the new lower
level. MI increases contemporaneously with a liq-
Chart 4
Errors in Projecting Growth Rates
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16uid savings shockbutthen falls and keeps declining
for nearly a year as well.
The impulse response functions suggest that the
reactions ofM1to portfolio shocks have undergone
a number ofchanges after deregulation. Ml reacts
noticeably more strongly to innovations in the mar-
ket interest rate, large tetms accounts, liquid sav-
ings, and small time deposits in the 1980s than in
the pre-deregulation period. In the later period,
shocks to large term deposits and small time
deposits ledtolarge, permanentchanges inthe level
of Ml; these shocks do not appear to have had a
significanteffect onMl in the earlier period. More-
over, in the 1980s, Ml and liquid savings accounts
react in the. same direction and with the same
dynamic pattern to interest rate and large term
deposits shocks. Such behavior is much less evident
in the 1970s.
The behavior of the term components, namely
small time deposits and large term accounts, also
shows a noticeable difference across the two peri-
ods. In the pre-deregulation period, these two com-
ponents tended to move in opposite directions. In
the post-deregulation period, they move in the same
direction, which is usually opposite the movement
in liquid savings and Ml. The change in the
behaviorofsmalltime deposits probably reffects the
removal oftheinterest rate ceilings on them, which
has allowed banks to use these accounts as a man-
agedliability in the post-deregulation period. Small
time deposits therefore behave more like the man-
aged liabilities (such as, large certificates of
deposit) in the large term accounts component of
M3. As discussed below, this result has important
implications for the stability of the broader mone-
tary aggregate, M2.
Table 3.presents the variance decompositions for
Mloverthe two sample periods.9 In the pre-
deregulation period, innovations to Ml itself
accounted for around 80 percent of the variance of
the errorin predicting MI. The interestratevariable
accounted for no more than 4 percent ofthe forecast
errorvariance ofMl at any forecast horizon, while
the. three monetary components - large term
accounts, small time deposits and liquid savings-
taken together accounted for only 5 percent of the
Ml forecast error variance contemporaneously and
did not account for any more than 8 percent at any
forecast horizon. This situation is considerably dif-
ferent after deregulation. After the first few months,
MI accounts for only one-third of its own forecast
error variance, while interest rate innovations
account for aroundone-fourth. The otherthree com-
ponents ofM3 account for close to 20 percentofthe
contemporaneous forecast error variance of M1,
and close to 30 percent as the horizon lengthens.
This evidence supports the hypothesis that under
deregulation Ml has lost some ofits unique charac-
teristics as atransactions aggregateandhas taken on
the characteristics of a savings-type aggregate. MI
now appears to be much more susceptible to port-
folio shocks than it was prior to deregulation and it




Selected Interest Rate Differentials
1986 1965 1984 1983 1982
~
Small Time minus MMDA






1987, show that this similarity in response is due to
the similarity between NOW accounts and liquid
savings.) Moreover, it appears that the term/non-
term distinction between monetary components,
which is important for investors in choosing among
savings-type assets, has become more significant
than the transactions/nontransactions distinction.
The 1985-86 Episode
In Section I, we presented evidence showing that
structural money demand equations systematically
underpredicted MI in April 1985 through the end of
1986. To be sure that the VAR results are not
dominated by developments in 1985-86, we esti-
mated the VAR over the period from July 1981 to
March 1985. The MI variance decomposition from
the shorter period (Table 4) shows that the effect of
innovations to the other monetary aggregates is
similar to that obtained from the larger post-
18deregulation sample. Thus, Ml was sensItive to
innovations.in the other monetary aggregates even
before 1985.
On the surface, the apparent sensitivity ofMl to
changes in the other components ofM3 throughout
the 1980s contradicts the evidence from the struc-
tural M1demand equations discussed above. IfM1
had been contaminated with savings-type balances
throughoutthe 1980s, why is there so littleevidence
of upward shifts in Ml demand until 1985? An
answer is provided by Chart 4. This chart shows
successive twelve-month-ahead errors made in pre-
dicting the growthrate ofthe monetary components
Ml, liquid savings, small time deposits, and large
term accounts using the equations from the VAR
and assuming actual values for the righthand-side
variables. The projections for each year were based
onthe model estimated over the prior fiVe years.
The panel in the top leftcomershows theerrors in
predicting small time deposits. While the errors
made by the equation are relatively large prior to
1985, they tend to be scattered around zero. That is,
theerrors do not appearto besystematicallypositive
or negative. 10 However, the errors are almost uni-
formly negative beginning in the second quarter of
1985 (indicated by the dashed vertical line). This is
Chart 6
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19also the period when the demand for MI equation
began tounderpredictMI growth by a wide margin.
Moreover, theoverprediction ofsmall time deposits
in 1985-86 is consistent with the underprediction in
Mldemand, given the negative response of MI to
an innovation in small time deposits shown earlier
in theMI impulse response functions. The bottom
two panels of the chart show that there are no
systematic errors in predicting liquid savings or
large term accounts.
The results in Chart 4 provide a resolution ofthe
apparent contradiction between the MI demand
results and the VAR results. It appears that MI
demand did not show sustained upward shifts
related to deregulation prior to 1985 despite having
been contaminated with savings-type balances
because there were no large shocks to the monetary
components priorto 1985. In otherwords, although
the potential for instability in MI had been
increased by deregulation, actual instability did not
show up until sizeable shocks actually occurred.
This evidence leaves openthe questionofwhy the
large shocks to MI occurred in 1985-86, after
deregulation was largely complete. A plausible
hypothesis relates the instability to declines in the
spreads between yields on MI and those on close
substitutes. As shown in Chart5, these spreads have
declined sharply since the nationwide introduction
of NOWs in 1981; the substantial drop in market
rates relative to rates on NOWs and Super-NOWs
beginning in the latter half of 1984 brought these
spreads to all-time lows. The public may have
shifted nontransactions balances from small time
deposits into MI in response to the decline in the
yield on less liquid MI substitutes relative to yields
on NOWs.
Some analysts have argued that the very sharp
response of MI to this decline in yield implies that
20Ml's interest elasticity has increased. (See
Kretzmer and Porter, 1986.) Although this may be
the case, it is too soon to tell. If the public were
transferring balances to M1 because the yield dif-
ferential earned for close cash management has
become very small, the rapid growth in Ml may
represent a transitional adjustment rather than a
permanent change in the interest rate elasticity of
Mldemand.ll Indeed, the longrunelasticityofMl
demand may evenhave declined: for money holders
who have made the choice not to manage Ml
balances actively, a small change in the yield on
NOW accounts versus, say, the yield on small time
deposits, would have little effect on their demand
for MI.
The fact that two quite different interpretations of
the 1985-86 episode are possible illustrates the
recent nature of the "problems" with Ml demand,
problems that do not allow a reliable estimateofthe
complex structural MI-demandrelationships to test
alternative hypotheses. Consequently, it will con-
tinue to be difficult to interpret movements in Ml in
the foreseeable future.
M2 and M3
The analysis so far has focused on the interactions
between M1 and the other components of M3. It
also is ofinterestto examine what these interactions
imply for the behavior of the broader monetary
aggregates, M2 and M3, since the Fed established
target ranges for those aggregates. Ourresults sug-
gest that portfolio disturbances that disrupt the
behaviorofM1do nottend to disrupt M2 and M3 as
much because these other aggregates are broad
enough to internalize the shocks.
We use the VARs shown in Table 2 to obtain
results in terms of M2 and M3. This involved
aggregating the impulse response functions for the
various components obtained from the VAR and
then constructing variance decompositions. The
procedure followed is best illustratedby focusing on
a specific case, say the response ofM2 to an interest
rate shock. Since the model is estimated in growth
rates and since the various components ofM2 are of
different sizes in dollar levels, aggregation requires
the use ofweights for the growth rates ofeach ofthe
components (Ml, small time deposits, and liquid
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savings). The weight used for each component of
M2 was the average ratio ofthe level ofthat compo-
nent to the level ofM2 over the sample period. The
response of each of the 3 components of M2 to an
interestrate shock was then multiplied by thecorre-
sponding weight and the resulting terms added to
obtain the response ofM2 to an interest rate shock.
The same procedure was repeated to obtain the
response of M2 to the other shocks to the system.
The M2 forecast error variance decomposition was
obtained from these responses in the usual manner.
Charts 6 and 7 present the effect of unexpected
movements in interest rates, large term accounts,
small time deposits, and liquid savings on the
monetary aggregates M1, M2and M3. As shown in
Chart6, priorto deregulation, an interestrate shock
led to a permanent decrease in the level of all three
aggregates. The decrease in the level ofM2 was the
largest, while M1and M3 decreased by smaller, and
roughly equal amounts. After deregulation, Ml
decreases the most, while M3 actually returns to its
pre-shock level. M2's post-deregulation response is
only slightly smaller than its pre-deregulation
response.
Second, the charts show that post-deregulation,
M2 and M3 tend to move closely together in
response to a shock to any ofthe monetary compo-
nents. This is not surprising in view of our earlier
demonstration that in the post-deregulation period,
the responses oflarge term accounts to the portfolio
innovations are similar to the responses of small
time deposits.
The charts also show that the sensitivity ofM1to
the otherportfolio shockshas increasedin the 1980s
over the pre-deregulation period more than that of
M2 and M3. Moreover, over the post-deregulation
period, the responseofM1to any kindofinnovation
is substantially largerthan theresponseofeitherM2
orM3.
Tables 5 and 6 present the standard error of the
VAR forecasts and the variance decompositions for
M2 and M3 respectively. 12 Table 5 shows that the
error in predicting M2 more than a month into the
future actually has declined after deregulation.
However, the standard errors of the M1, liquid
savings and small time deposit forecasts are all
higher after deregulation. At a 3-month forecast
horizon, for example, the standard error of the M1forecast was 0.33 prior to deregulation and 0.48 in
the 1980s (seeTable 3). The corresponding numbers
for liquid savings are 0.48 and 0.78 and for small
timedeposits, 0.42 and 0.59. Thus, M2 has become
easier to predict after deregulation not because its
components are more "well-behaved", but because
the unpredictable changes in its components tend to
offset each other more than they did prior to
deregulation.
By contrast, Table 6 shows that the forecast error
variance ofM3 has increased after deregulation. At
the 3-month forecast horizon, for example, this
variance has increased from 0.15 to 0.20. Underly-
ing this is a substantial increase in the forecast error
variance of large term accounts, which (at the
3-month horizon) has increased from 0.75 in the
pre-deregulation period to 1.14 in the post-
deregulation period. Notice also that the variance of
theerrors in predictingM3 is closeto the variance of
the errors in predicting M2 after deregulation,
whereas earlier the former was noticeably smaller.
Our results suggest that M2 and M3 are about
equally robust in the face of portfolio shocks.
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Months after shockM3 on the grounds that M3 includes banks' man-
aged liabilities, such as large certificates ofdeposit.
(See, for example, Gramley, 1986.) Because very
close substitutes for large term accounts exist in the
credit market - such as commercial paper - it is
argued that the demand for large term accounts is
likely to be relatively unstable. As a result, move-
ments in M3 are not likely to provide any informa-
tion that is useful for policy purposes. Moreover, it
is argued that since the instruments in M2 are not
managed liabilities, that aggregate is less likely to
be adversely affected by substitutions with credit
market instruments.
However, the impulse response functions shown
in Charts 2 and 3 contradict the latter assertion.
They suggest that there is little difference in the
behavior of small denomination time deposits
(which are in M2) and large term accounts. This
result is confirmed by a survey conducted by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York between
November 1986 and January 1987 that concluded
that "Tobanks, consumerCDs (whatwe have called
small time deposits) are an alternative to funding
through wholesale deposits" (our large time
deposits). 13,14
To summarize, our analysis of the conventional
monetary aggregates suggests that deregulation
appears to have had the greatest impact on MI, and
that changes in the behavior of M2 and M3 have
been relatively small. M1 appears to have become
more susceptible to portfolio shifts, but these
shocks to M1generally are represented by portfolio
re-allocations within the broader aggregates. In
addition, M2 has become easier to predict in the
post-deregulation period, even as its components
have become more difficult to predict.
III. Policy Implications
Our results support the FaMe's decision to drop
Ml from the set of variables being targeted. The
increase in the degree of substitutability between
M1and other other components ofM3 implies that
the behavior of Ml is likely to be dominated by
portfolio considerations, at least over the short run.
Consequently, movements in Ml are not likely to
provide useful information about variables such as
prices and income, which are of interest to policy-
makers. Moreover, our results suggest that M2 and
M3 are not as susceptible as Ml to being disturbed
by portfolio shifts because they are broad enough to
internalize most of those shifts. Thus, our results
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support the FOMC's decision to continue to estab-
lish target ranges for M2 and M3.
IfM2 and M3 were the aggregates of choice, is
there any evidence that favors greater emphasis on
one rather than the other? Some analysts have
argued that M2 is clearly superior for monetary
policy purposes because M3 includes instruments
that are used by banks as managed liabilities. Our
results suggest no basis for preferring one over the
other since small time deposits, which are in M2,
now appear to be used by banks much like the
managed liabilities in M3.ApPENDIX A
Definitions of Variables













three-month commercial paper rate
second difference in the log oftotal loans ofcommercial banks, including loans sold to affiliates, and
adjusted for the introduction ofinternational banking facilities.
10gofMl
log ofthe non-M1component ofM2
log ofthe non-M1component ofM3
log of personal consumption expenditures deflator
log of nominal personal income
1,2, ... 12 during January 1981 through December 1981.
the square ofTIME
the cube ofTIME
1,2, . . . 13 during December 1982 through December 1983, zero elsewhere.
the square ofTIMEDR
LMI AO + Al*DDLBL + A2*(LY-LP)
+ A3*LP + A4*CPRT
+ A5*TIME + A6*TIME2
+ A7*TIME3 + A8*(LMI, j-LP)




















RESTRICTIONS: A3 = 1.00
Sample Period: August 1976 - December 1984



















AUTO1 = 1.43 (17.32)
AUT02 = -0.47(-5.64)
RESTRICTIONS: Coefficients Cl and C2 estimated with a second order Almon distribution over lags t to t - 14 and
tto t - 8, respectively, where the far end-point is tied to zero. Reported coefficients are for the sumsof
the lag distributions.
Sample Period: August 1976 - December 1984



















AUlDi = 1.53 (18.92)
AUT02 = - 0.55 ( 6.45)
RESTRICTIONS: Coefficients DI and D2 estimated with a second order Almon distribution over lags t to t - 14 and t to
t 8, respectively, where the far end-point is tied to zero. Reported coefficients are for the sums ofthe
lag distributions.
Sample Period: August 1976 - December 1984
ApPENDIX B
Table 81





































































































Ordering: M1, Liquid Savings, Small TIme Deposits, Large Term Accounts, R, DEF, RPY
Pre-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 100
1 5 0 3 0 0 0 91
3 5 1 3 0 0 2 88
6 5 1 3 1 1 2 86
12 5 1 3 1 1 2 86
Post-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 100
1 3 3 5 1 7 7 73
3 4 2 22 3 17 5 47
6 7 2 21 5 18 5 42
12 9 2 22 6 19 4 39
Table 83
M2 Variance Decomposition
Ordering: M1, Liquid Savings, Small Time Deposits, Large Term Accounts, R, DEF, RPY
Pre-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 0 29 29 42
1 5 0 11 1 27 27 29
3 4 2 9 6 29 26 24
6 4 2 10 13 27 22 22
12 4 2 10 16 26 21 22
Post-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 0 28 35 37
1 5 0 17 1 20 29 27
3 9 1 28 1 15 22 24
6 10 2 29 1 16 20 21
12 10 3 29 i 16 20 21
26Table 84
M3 Variance Decomposition
Ordering: M1, Liquid Savings, Small Time Deposits, Large Term Accounts, R, DEF, RPY
Pre-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 49 0 11 39
1 4 2 2 45 0 13 34
3 13 2 3 35 2 18 26
6 12 2 6 34 3 20 24
12 11 2 6 36 3 19 24
Post-Deregulation
Large Small
Months Real Interest Term Time Liquid
Ahead Income Price Rate Accounts Deposits Savings M1
0 50 15 21 14
1 3 0 6 41 20 18 12
3 3 3 12 33 18 16 14
6 3 4 16 30 20 14 12
12 4 4 16 30 21 13 12
FOOTNOTES
1. Testimony of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States
Senate, February 19, 1987, pg. 26. Also see, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Monetary Pol-
icy Report to Congress Pursuant to the Full Employment on
Balanced Growth Act of 1978," February 19, 1987.
2. See Keran (1983), Judd (1983), Judd and Motley
(1984).
3. Disinflation seems to have caused greater problems
than did deregulation for using M1 as an intermediate
target of monetary policy. Disinflation after 1980 induced
declines in nominal interest rates that led to temporary
decreases in M1 velocity that contrasted with its steady
upward trend in the preceding two decades. In fact,
disinflation appearstoaccountfor all of the net reduction in
M1 velocity in 1981 through 1983. Estimates using the San
Francisco Money Market Model implied an M1 velocity
growth trend of0.8 percent per year in steady state, that is,
when interest rates and inflation are constant and real GNP
is advancing at its long-run potential rate of 3 percent.
From the fourth quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of
1983, M1 velocity declined at an annual rate of0.5 percent.
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Under the assumption that the expected inflation rate in
any given month is equal to actual inflation over the pre-
vious twelve months, the coefficients in the model sug-
gested that disinflation reduced the annual growth rate of
M1 velocity by 1.7 percentage points in 1981 through
1983. Thus, without the disinflation that occurred in those
years, M1 velocity would have increased at a 1.2 percent
rate - close to its steady state trend.
Of course, these velocity declines would not have caused
problems for monetary policy had they been anticipated.
Unfortunately, they did seriously complicate the setting of
monetarytargets because, as often is the case, disinflation
proceeded in unpredictable "fits and starts".
4. See Mehra (1986).
5. These simulation results rest on movements in the
conventional moneydemand arguments of real income, an
aggregate price index, and a nominal market rate of
interest. As shown in Appendix A, the M1 equation also
includes the growth in bank loans as an explanatory vari-
able, but this non-traditional argument has little effect on
the simulation results presented in the table. See "AModel
of the Money and Bank Loan Markets," Federal ReserveBank of San Francisco, April 1987.
6. A similar model is estimated in Trehan and Walsh
(1987). That model does not include small time deposits
and liquid savings, but does include a forward rate of
interest.
7. Even though Institution only Money Market Mutual
Funds are more liquid than time deposits, we did not
remove them from large term deposits to include them in
liquid savings. Doing so would mean that we would no
longer be able to aggregate the various components in a
straightforward manner to obtain M2 and M3. The other
alternative, including these accounts as a separate van-
able in the VAR, was rejected because it would increase
the number of variables in the system without yielding any
further insights.
8. The results were calculated under the following
"ordering" of the model's variables: RPY, DEF, R, large
term accounts, small time deposits, liquid savings, and
Mi. The ordering imposed upon the variables is a way of
transforming the residuals from the VAR so that they can be
interpreted as disturbances to specific variables in the
system. This transformation is necessary because the
residuals from the VAR tend to be correlated with each
other. Consequently, the datacan only be interpreted after
the researcher has chosen some method of determining
which variable is the causal factor behind the observed
correlations.
By placing income first in our ordering, we are assuming
that the entire contemporaneous correlation between
unpredicted movements in income and other variables in
the system is due to shocks to income. In other words, we
assume that a shock to any of the other variables has no
contemporaneous impact on income. Next, the entire con-
temporaneous correlation between DEF and the remaining
variables in the system is assumed to be due to shocks to
DEF. Similarly, while shocks to the interest rate have a
contemporaneous impact on the monetary components in
the VAR, shocks to the latter have no contemporaneous
impact on the former, and so on.
The ordering we chose is equivalent to that imposed in
studies of the money demand function, that is, contempo-
raneous shocks to income, prices, and interest rates are
allowed to have an effect on money, but money is not
allowed to affect the others. In principle, the results could
be sensitive to the precise ordering imposed upon the
system. Therefore, in Appendix Bwe present some results
for the case where the ordering is the reverse of what we
impose here. In general, our results are not very sensitive
to this change.
9. In Table 3, the variables are ordered in the way they
were for the impulse response functions, specifically, the
ordering is RPY, DEF, R, large term accounts, small time
deposits, liquid savings and M1. Table B2 in Appendix B
reverses this ordering. While the reversal increases the
share of M1forecast variance explained by M1innovations
(or shocks) as expected, the change in the variance
decomposition is not startling when compared to the origi-
nal ordering. In the pre-deregulation period, interest rate
innovations account for a maximum of 3 percent, while the
other 3 components of M3 taken together account for a
maximum of 4 percent of the M1 forecast error variance
Reversing the ordering leaves the share of interest rate
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innovations more or less unchanged in the post deregula-
tion period as well. The share of the other components of
M3 taken together is also approximatelythe same as under
the original ordering. However, the share of small time
deposits goes up somewhat and the share of liquid sav-
ings innovations is correspondingly smaller.
10. The equation does not, of course, predict the move-
ments associated with the introduction of Super-NOWs
and MMDAs. The errors in these months have been set to
zero.
11. In terms of the Baumol-Tobin model of the demand for
transactions balances, a larger proportion of cash holders
may have reached cash-management "corner solutions".
12. The ordering is the same as before, that is, the vari-
ables are ordered RPY, DEF, R, large term deposits, small
time deposits, liquid savings and Mi. Results from the
reverse ordering are shown in Tables B3 and B4 in Appen-
dix B.
13. See Davis, Korobow and Wenninger.
14. More direct evidence on the extent of the potential
problem with M3 is provided by a VAR we estimated that
contained, in addition to the variables in the previous VAR
(Table 2), assets included in the Fed's liquid asset mea-
sure, l, but not in M3 (for example, short-term treasury
securities and commercial paper). We call these credit
market instruments Netl. Underthe hypothesized problem
of M3, variations in large term deposits should be closely
correlated to movements in Netl. For example, when
banks raise interest rates on large time deposits to obtain
more funds, individuals would respond by selling off short-
term Treasury securities and commercial paper to acquire
large time deposits. Further, since NetM2 is hypothesized
to be less sensitive to these influences, it should be much
less closely correlated with Netl. (NetM2 is the difference
between M2 and M1 and equals the sum of our liquid
savings and small time deposits components. See the box
on "Monetary Aggregates." Note also that our large term
accounts component is the same as the conventional
NetM3)
An examination of the contemporaneous correlations
between the residuals from the VAR estimated over the
post-deregulation period does not support these hypoth-
eses. The correlation between Netl and large term
deposits is .01 ,between Netland small time deposits is .1.,
and between Netl and liquid savings, - .25. The assocI-
ated variance decompositions also do not suggest that
there is amarked difference between NetM2 and NetM3. In
particular, with Netl ordered before both NetM2 and
NetM3, innovations to Netl account for approximately 3
percent of the forecast error variance of NetM2 and 5
percentofthe forecast error variance of NetM3 for forecast
horizons up to 2 years. Consequently, the evidence does
not justify a preference for M2 over M3.
The result that innovations in Netl explain very little of the
forecast error variance decomposition of NetM2 and large
term deposits has another important implication, namely,
that there appears to be little gain in going from M3 to a still
broader aggregate. In other words, while the recent port-
folio disturbances have not been internalized within M1,
they doappearto have been internalized Within M3 and, to
a lesser extent, within M2.REFERENCES
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